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FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6393  
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0463  
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 2927  
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 2287  
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINGSTON 000487

SIPDIS

DEPT PASS CENTRAL AMERICAN CARIBBEAN BASIN COLLECTIVE FOR INFO

DEPT FOR WHA/CAR - MICHAEL FORTIN, JOE TILGHMAN WHA - GIOVANNI SNIDLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2018

TAGS: [PTER](#) [PREL](#) [MASS](#) [MOPS](#) [ASEC](#) [SNAR](#) [PBTS](#) [DHS](#) [JM](#) [XL](#)

SUBJECT: JAMAICA: INPUT FOR CARIBBEAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT

REF: A. STATE 51747 (151536Z MAY 08)  
[1](#)B. PORT OF SPAIN 170 (101533Z APR 08)(NOTAL)  
[1](#)C. BRIDGETOWN 237 (072131Z APR 08)(NOTAL)

Classified By: DCM JAMES T. HEG, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)

Summary

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1.(C) This cable provides Embassy Kingston's response to refotel (A), "Caribbean Security Assessment." Post believes that augmentation of USG assistance in the following areas would benefit Jamaica and the region, and ultimately improve U.S. security:

-- upgrade of the Jamaican Immigration Service's entry/exit system, ENTRIX;

-- improvement of passport issuance integrity;

-- development of a regional data sharing capacity for fingerprints, with linkage to the U.S. to permit regional governments to send inquiries through for verification by U.S. databases;

-- assessment of needs to determine how the region's customs services could be linked together to share shipping information similar to the Automated Targeting System (ATS) used by the Container Security Initiative (CSI).

-- establishment/coordination of a force of U.S. polygraph experts drawn from all USG agencies on whom regional governments could call to conduct vetting of personnel;

-- provision of fixed wing surveillance aircraft and night vision equipment.

End Summary.

Current Security Activity

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2.(C) The Government of Jamaica (GOJ) is actively engaged with its international partners to detect and deter international criminal organizations from operating in Jamaica. It has had success over the last five years in raising the cost borne by traffickers to transit cocaine through Jamaica, resulting in a significant decrease in traffic levels. Jamaica is a Container Security Initiative

(CSI) and Mega Ports partner nation, and U.S. Customs inspectors are operating in Jamaica with only limited resistance. The Jamaica Defence Force (JDF)'s Military Intelligence Unit continues to monitor the island for terrorist activity. The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) is unfortunately riddled with corruption.

3.(C) There are a few effective units within the JCF: the Major Investigations Task Force; the Fugitive Apprehension Unit; the Narcotics Police Vetted Unit; and Operation Kingfish, which has taken on all intelligence collection for the JCF. A new Commissioner of Police was named in December, 2007, and he and the GOJ are committed to a remaking of the force over the next three years. As police corruption is addressed, the JCF will hopefully become a better, more committed partner in combating international criminal organizations. The Immigration and Customs services also are handicapped by corruption. The Custom Service's Contraband Enforcement Team recently lost its Director and Deputy Director -- the former to retirement, while the latter resigned to become an ICE investigator. Both decided to leave CET because they could not continue to fight against the Commissioner of Customs, who is widely believed to be at the center of the Service's corrupt operations. National security efforts also are constrained by the country's onerous debt burden: at almost 130 percent, Jamaica's debt-to-GDP ratio is among the world's highest.

4.(C) The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's Kingston Country Office (DEA/KCO) has an outstanding long-term relationship with the Jamaica Constabulary Force Narcotics Unit (JCF/NU). Over the years, DEA/KCO has provided financial, experiential, and academic support to the JCF/NU, which they always have embraced; they have matured in their ability to effectively combat illicit drug trafficking. The DEA/KCO has benefited from the free flow of information and evidence sharing, which has led to the successful investigation and prosecution of several infamous Jamaican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) impacting the USA.

#### Augmentation of Current Security Efforts

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5.(C) Post believes that an augmentation of U.S. assistance in the following areas would benefit Jamaica and the region, and ultimately improve U.S. security:

(A) the Jamaican Immigration Service's entry/exit system, ENTRIX ) a U.S ) IOM Funded system, is running over capacity. The GOJ does not have funds to upgrade the system. Because its data storage server is overflowing, the Service recently made the decision to erase all 2005 entry-exit records. In addition, because the ENTRIX system is running over capacity, there is no real-time data sharing between the ports of entry (Kingston, Montego Bay, Ocho Rios) and the central server. It is entirely feasible, therefore, for a wanted individual or terrorist to enter, transit, and exit Jamaica without his/her name coming up. Data is only downloaded into the system when it recycles at night. The system also does not have the ability to link to watch lists, such as INTERPOL red notices, Persons of Interest and Fugitives list, which are being held by the Joint Regional Communications Center (JRCC) in Bridgetown. The Immigration Service is seeking assistance to upgrade ENTRIX capacity. Post recommends support of this request to ensure preservation of historical data, the ability of the system to perform real time data inquiries, and the possible linkage of ENTRIX to the JRCC for watch list inquiries.

(B) The Immigration Service does not have adequate passport security. The actual passport books and processing of passports meets current international standards, i.e. machine readable, biometric passports. However, officers within the passport agency are selling valid Jamaican passports using false identification information to criminals. For example, on May 15, Kathy Nelson, wanted by the U.S. Marshal's Service, traveled from Nevada and attempted to enter Jamaica

using a valid Jamaican passport that had her photo in it but under another name. The passport was issued in Jamaica and mailed to Ms. Nelson in the United States. Post recommends measures to improve passport issuance integrity, e.g.: collection of additional biometric data such as fingerprints to verify identity, which then could be cross checked against the Jamaicans' digital fingerprint database; vetting of immigration staff to weed out corrupt individuals; and a needs assessment to determine ways in which the immigration service could improve its passport integrity.

(C) Jamaica's current digital fingerprint database does not cross check criminal inquiries against the database's civil records (which are held for only 30 days because of a lack of storage capacity). The GOJ currently is working on an MOU with the UK to share this database and send inquiries to the UK for name checks. Post would see value in: 1) developing regional data sharing capacity for fingerprints; and 2) linking that to the U.S. to permit regional governments to send inquiries through for verification by U.S. databases. This database, if shared with the U.S., could also benefit our consular operations in decreasing the likelihood that we would issue valid travel documents to known or suspected criminals. Currently, our systems here only catch criminals known to U.S. databases.

(D) Jamaica's Customs Service has no digital database to collect, store, sort, or profile incoming, transit, or outbound cargo, nor does the service have any capacity to track shipments by shipper. Currently, when ships arrive at Kingston Terminals, the officers manually inspect them and keep notes on random pieces of paper. There is no data sharing between customs and the police department, and no network of regional contacts to verify that the manifest and shipper information does not change from island to island. Post recommends a needs assessment to determine how the region's customs services could be linked together to share shipping information similar to the Automated Targeting System (ATS) used by the Container Security Initiative (CSI).

(E) Ad hoc vetting of select units within the police, military, customs and immigration service has occurred over the last two years. Each time this vetting occurs, there is a scramble to identify USG agencies with available polygraph experts. As corruption is not unique to Jamaica but is pervasive within the region, Post recommends that a regional strike force of polygraph experts from all USG agencies be established on whom local governments could call to conduct vetting of personnel.

(F) Jamaica has neither adequate fixed wing surveillance aircraft, nor night vision equipment, which inhibits its ability to interdict incoming contraband and prevents it from participating more fully in regional operations.

#### Current Funding levels

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6.(SBU) Jamaica currently benefits from the following programs:

INCLE ) Counter-narcotics and anti-crime ) FY09 ) 850K  
IMET ) International Military Education and Training ) FY09  
750K  
FMF ) Foreign Military Financing ) FY09 800K  
NADR ) Counter-terrorism training ) FY09 (at present,  
zeroed out; anticipate restoration to 500K)

#### Training effectiveness for Police/Military

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7.(SBU) The JDF takes advantage of numerous U.S. training opportunities. Our IMET program is a core part of their officers' and NCOs' professional development, and is now their main commissioning source for officers entering the force (through OCS). The JDF also benefits from JCETs, ship visits, and training in support of Operation Enduring Friendship. The JDF uses the training they receive, and it

has made a difference in their organization.

8.(SBU) DS-funded training programs have been positively received and utilized by the Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF). One course entitled the Management of Major Events was used successfully during the Cricket World Cup, held in Jamaica in 2007. Another recent course was Weapons of Mass Destruction, which coordinated Jamaican police, military, fire/rescue forces, and hospital and medical service professionals to overcome man-made disasters. This introduction and cooperation also could be used to handle natural disasters, such as hurricanes, fires and earthquakes.

9.(SBU) Three established programs in Jamaica which have a regional impact, and for which U.S. support has been requested, are:

-- the University of the West Indies (UWI) Masters Program in National Security and Strategic Studies;

-- the Junior Command and Staff Course, which targets development of junior officers from throughout the region;

-- the National Security and Strategic Studies Program, in which current and near-future senior leaders of the regional security apparatus participate.

History of effectiveness w/in region

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10.(SBU) The JDF performs well in the multi-national exercises in which it participates: Tradewinds, PKO N, and Fuerzas Comandos. JDF participants are recognized as professional and are looked up to by other Caribbean nations.

The relationship between the DEA/KCO and the JFC/NU has facilitated the implementation of several technological investigative programs which have significantly impacted and disrupted the modus operandi of multiple large-scale international Jamaican DTOs. DEA/KCO is operationally satisfied with the quality of work produced by the JFC/NU.

Weaknesses in Cooperation and Information Sharing

11.(C) The JDF's use of CNIES has been constrained because of the limited U.S. resources supporting counter-drug operations in Jamaican waters. The Operation Riptide scheduled for Aug 08 will be the first one since 2005.

JOHNSON